The interplay of random phenomena and continuous dynamics deserves increased attention, especially in the context of wireless sensing and control applications. Safety verification for such systems thus needs to consider probabilistic variants of systems with hybrid dynamics. In safety verification of classical hybrid systems, we are interested in whether a certain set of unsafe system states can be reached from a set of initial states. In the probabilistic setting, we may ask instead whether the probability of reaching unsafe states is below some given threshold. In this paper, we consider probabilistic hybrid systems and develop a general abstraction technique for verifying probabilistic safety problems. This gives rise to the first mechanisable technique that can, in practice, formally verify safety properties of non-trivial continuous-time stochastic hybrid systems. Moreover, being based on abstractions computed by tools for the analysis of non-probabilistic hybrid systems, improvements in effectivity of such tools directly carry over to improvements in effectivity of the technique we describe. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on a number of case studies, tackled using a prototypical implementation.
Introduction
Hybrid systems constitute a general and widely applicable class of dynamical systems with both discrete and continuous components. Conventional hybrid system formalisms [3, 27, 13, 30 ] capture many characteristics of real systems. However, in many modern application areas, also probabilistic dynamics occur. This is especially true for wireless sensing and control applications, where message loss probabilities and other random effects (node placement, node failure, battery drain) turn the overall control problem into a problem that can only be managed with a certain, hopefully sufficiently large, probability: Due to the influence of these random effects, the success (for example keeping the hybrid system in a safe region) can only be guaranteed with a probability less than one.
The need to integrate probabilities into hybrid systems formalisms has led to several different notions of stochastic hybrid systems, each from a distinct perspective [2, 32, 9, 11, 1] . The most important distinction lies in the point of attack where to introduce randomness. One option is to replace deterministic jumps by probability distributions over deterministic jumps. Another option is to generalise the differential equation components inside a mode by a stochastic differential equations component. More general models can be obtained by blending the above two choices, and by combining them with memoryless timed probabilistic jumps [8] , and with nondeterminism. One prominent example of such a blend is the model of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes [15] , a deterministic hybrid system model augmented with memoryless timed probabilistic jumps.
An important problem in hybrid systems theory is that of reachability analysis. In general terms, a reachability analysis problem consists in evaluating whether a given system may reach certain unsafe states, starting from certain initial states. This problem is associated with the safety verification problem: to prove that the system can never reach any unsafe state. In the probabilistic setting, the safety verification problem can be formulated as that of checking whether the probability that the system trajectories reach an unsafe state from an initial state can be bounded by some given probability threshold.
In this paper, we focus on the model of probabilistic hybrid automata [32] , an extension of hybrid automata where jumps involve probability distributions. This adds the possibility to represent model-component failures, message losses, buffer overflows and the like. Since these phenomena are important aspects when aiming at faithful models for networked and embedded applications, the interest in this formalism is growing [16, 33] . We are striving for computational tools to support the analysis of the models of Sproston [32] and more complicated models, based on mathematically sound foundations.
Up to now, foundational results on the probabilistic reachability problem for probabilistic hybrid automata are scarce. Since they form a strict superclass of hybrid automata, this is not surprising. Decidability results are available for probabilistic linear hybrid automata and probabilistic o-minimal hybrid automata [32] .
This paper explains how we can harvest and combine recent advances in the hybrid automata and the probabilistic automata worlds, in order to treat the general case. We are doing so by computing safe overapproximations via abstractions in the continuous as well as the probabilistic domain. One of the core challenges then is how to construct a sound probabilistic abstraction over a given covering (i.e., set of abstract states, each of which is formed by a subset of the concrete state space, such that their union equals the complete concrete state space) of the state space. For this purpose, we first consider the nonprobabilistic hybrid automaton obtained by replacing probabilistic branching with nondeterministic choices. Provided that we have obtained a finite abstraction for this classical hybrid automaton, we then decorate it with probabilities to obtain a probabilistic abstraction, namely a finite probabilistic automaton [31] . We show the soundness of the approach, which allows us to verify probabilistic safety properties on the abstraction: if such a property holds in the abstraction, it holds also in the concrete system. Otherwise, refinement is required to obtain a more precise result.
Our abstraction approach can be considered as an orthogonal combination of definitions of abstraction for hybrid automata [4, 30] , and for Markov decision processes [14, 19] . Because of this orthogonality, abstractions of probabilistic hybrid automata can be computed via abstractions for non-probabilistic hybrid automata and Markov decision processes. To show the applicability of this combination, we implemented a prototype tool, ProHVer, that builds an abstraction via a combination of existing techniques for classical hybrid automata [17] as well as methods for Markov decision processes [14, 25, 19] . Subsequently, a fixed-point engine computes the reachability probabilities on the abstraction, which provides a safe upper bound on the reachability probability in the model semantics. If needed, iterative refinement of the hybrid abstraction is performed. We report several successful applications of this prototypical implementation on different case studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation that automatically checks safety properties for probabilistic hybrid automata.
The framework considered here has the advantage of orthogonality: if a nonprobabilistic abstraction is used that differs from the one we employ in this paper, then this abstraction can be extended with probabilities in a very similar fashion. Furthermore, future computational advances in hybrid automata analysis can directly be harvested for the model of probabilistic hybrid automata.
Organisation of the paper. We first discuss related work in Section 2, and then recall the definitions we use in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the notion of abstractions for probabilistic hybrid automata, and discuss how to compute the abstractions for safety verification problems. We illustrate our approach by applying it on a small model in Section 5. In Section 6, we describe an implementation of our algorithm and apply it on several case studies. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
The model considered in this paper extends (nondeterministic) hybrid automata with probabilistic discrete jumps. Davis [15] introduced piecewise-deterministic Markov processes, whose state changes are triggered spontaneously as in continuous-time Markov chains. Apart from forced and spontaneous probabilistic jumps, general stochastic hybrid systems [20, 10] comprise stochastic differential equations [5] . They can incorporate random perturbations, such as Brownian motion, into the continuous dynamics. While these models-with and without nondeterminism-enjoy a very rich variety of applications, their analysis is limited and often based on Monte-Carlo simulations [11, 22, 1, 12] of systems without nondeterminism. Another approximate analysis technique, restricted to systems without nondeterminism, relies on the use of stochastic simulation functions [23] .
From the hybrid automata perspective, the general verification problem for safety properties is known to be undecidable. Certain classes (e.g., initialised rectangular automata [18] , o-minimal hybrid automata [26] ) are decidable, and there are algorithms that construct finite bisimulation quotients for them. These methods have been lifted to probabilistic hybrid automata by Sproston [32] , and this can be used to compute exact results, rooted in a bisimulation-based abstraction. In these special cases, we can parametrise our principal technique in such a way that it yields the very same exact results. In practice however, our method gives us the liberty to use an abstraction that overapproximates the behaviour, and is tailored to the problem at hand. The computational results will then not be exact, but overapproximating. This relies on the use of nondeterminism as a powerful abstraction mechanism, and extends to undecidable classes as well. Indeed, we treat the general case using the fact that a practical verification can-to a certain extent-circumvent the decidability barrier by a heuristic algorithm: we exploit tools which can, in practice, verify hybrid automata belonging to undecidable classes, to verify corresponding probabilistic hybrid automata (cf. also the notion of quasi-decidability [29] ). While Sproston focuses on decidability results for particular classes of probabilistic hybrid models, this paper considers safety verification for models in full generality. The paper is based on an earlier conference paper [34] .
Abstraction approaches have also successfully been applied to probabilistic timed automata [25, 24] , a class of probabilistic hybrid automata, where only derivatives of constant value 1 occur. Their abstract analysis is based on difference-bound matrices (DBMs), and does not extend to the general setting considered here. Fränzle et al. [16, 33] use stochastic SAT to solve reachability problems on probabilistic hybrid automata. Their analysis is limited to depth-bounded reachability properties, i.e., the probability of reaching a location within at most N discrete jumps.
Preliminaries
In this section, we repeat the definition of conventional hybrid automata, in the style of [30] , followed by the definition of probabilistic hybrid automata [32] .
Hybrid Automata

Syntax
We fix a variable m ranging over a finite set of discrete modes M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } and variables x 1 , . . . , x k ranging over the real numbers R. We denote by S the resulting state space M × R k . For denoting the derivatives of x 1 , . . . , x k we use variablesẋ 1 , . . . ,ẋ k , ranging over R correspondingly. The primed versions m , x 1 , . . . , x k shall be used to describe the next state in a transition. For simplicity, we sometimes use the vector x to denote (x 1 , . . . , x k ), and (m, x) to denote a state. Similar notations are used for the primed and dotted versions x ,˙ x.
In order to describe hybrid automata, we use constraints that are arbitrary Boolean combinations of equalities and inequalities over terms. This way, constraints represent subsets of given sets. In case v is contained in the set represented by a given constraint, we say that v satisfies a given constraint. These constraints are used, on the one hand, to describe the possible flows and jumps and, on the other hand, to mark certain parts of the state space (e.g., the set of initial/unsafe states). A state-space constraint is a constraint over the variables m, x, and represents a subset of M × R k . A flow constraint is a constraint over the variables m, x,˙ x. It represents a subset of M × R k × R k . An example of a flow constraint for the case n = 2 and k = 1 is:
In general, an invariant that has to hold in a mode can be modelled by formulating a flow constraint that does not allow a continuous behaviour in certain regions. As an example, the flow constraint (m = m 1 → 1 ≤ x ≤ 5) expresses that in mode m 1 the invariant 1 ≤ x ≤ 5 holds.
For capturing the jump behaviours, we introduce the notion of update constraints. An update constraint u, also called a guarded command, has the form: condition → update where condition is a state-space constraint over m, x, and update is an expression denoting a function M × R k → M × R k which is called the reset mapping for m and x. Intuitively, assume that the state (m, x) satisfies condition, then the mode m and variable x are updated 1 to the new state update(m, x).
A jump constraint is a finite disjunction u∈U u where U is a set of guarded commands. The constraint u∈U u can be represented by the set U for simplicity. A flow of length l in a mode m is a function r : [0, l] → R k such that
• if l > 0, then r is differentiable for all t ∈ [0, l], and we require that (m, r(t),ṙ(t))
satisfies Flow , whereṙ is the derivative of r, and
• if l = 0, we require that there exists a constant c ∈ R k such that (m, r(t), c) satisfies Flow .
Provided that the constraint of a jump is enabled, in systems modelled in a reasonable manner, it will usually be the case that the corresponding jump leads to a state in which a valid flow exists. This also restricts valid states of the hybrid automaton.
Transition System Semantics
The semantics of a hybrid automaton is a transition system with an uncountable set of states. and T D corresponds to transitions due to discrete jumps. The transition due to an update constraint u : condition → update, denoted by T D (u), is defined by:
satisfies the guard condition and it holds that (m , x ) = update(m, x).
Then, we define T D = u∈U T D (u).
In the rest of the paper, if no confusion arises, we use Init to denote both the constraint for the initial states and the set of initial states. Similarly, UnSafe is used to denote both the constraint for the unsafe states and the set of unsafe states.
Probabilistic Automata
For defining the semantics of a probabilistic hybrid automaton, we recall first the notion of a probabilistic automaton [31] . It is an extension of a transition system with probabilistic branching.
We first introduce some notation. Let S be a (possibly uncountable) set. A distribution over S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that (a) the support Supp(µ) = {s ∈ S | µ(s) > 0} is finite, and (b) it is s∈S µ(s) = 1. Let Distr (S) denote the set of all distributions over S. For an arbitrary but fixed state s ∈ S, a Dirac distribution for s, denoted by Dirac s , is a distribution over S such that Dirac s (s) = 1, that is, Supp(Dirac s ) = {s}. The Dirac distribution will be used to describe the continuous evolution of a probabilistic hybrid automaton. • Init is the set of initial states,
• UnSafe the set of unsafe states, and
• Steps the transition relation.
We use s → µ as a shorthand notation for (s, µ) ∈ Steps, and call µ a successor distribution of s. Let Steps(s) be the set {µ | (s, µ) ∈ Steps}. We assume that Steps(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S.
A finite path of M is finite sequence σ = s 0 µ 0 s 1 µ 1 . . . s n such that s i → µ i and µ i (s i+1 ) > 0 for all possible 0 ≤ i < n. Infinite paths are defined by taking n = ∞. We denote by first(σ) the first state s 0 of σ, by σ[i] the (i + 1)-th state s i , and, if σ is finite, by last(σ) the last state of σ. Let Path be the set of all infinite paths and Path * the set of all finite paths.
The nondeterministic choices in M are resolved by adversaries. Intuitively, an adversary of M is a measurable map A : Path * → Distr (Steps) such that A(σ)(s, µ) > 0 implies that s = last(σ) and s → µ. If A(σ)(s, µ) > 0, then the successor distribution µ should be selected from state s with probability A(σ)(s, µ). Given an initial state s, an adversary A induces a discrete-time Markov chain with state space Path * in an obvious way. We let Prob A s denote the corresponding unique probability measure [28] over Path.
Probabilistic Hybrid Automata
Now we recall the definition of probabilistic hybrid automata, by equipping the discrete jumps with probabilities. This is needed to model, for example, component failure or message losses.
Syntax
For capturing the probabilistic jump behaviours, a probabilistic guarded command c is defined to have the form
where q c ≥ 1 denotes the number of probabilistic branching of c, p i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , q c and qc i=1 p i = 1, condition is a constraint over (m, x), and update i is an expression denoting a reset mapping for m and x for all i = 1, . . . , q c . Intuitively, if a state (m, x) satisfies the guard condition, a jump to states (m 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (m qc , x qc ) occurs such that (m i , x i ) = update i (m, x) is selected with probability p i for i = 1, . . . , q c . Observe that for different i = j, it could be the case that (m i , x i ) = (m j , x j ). In this paper we assume that q c is finite for all c. As for the non-probabilistic setting, we assume that conditions are enabled only if corresponding jumps lead to a state in which a flow exists.
An example for the case n = 2, k = 1 and q c = 2 is:
where Flow , Init, UnSafe are the same as in the hybrid automaton, and C is a finite set of probabilistic guarded commands.
A probabilistic hybrid automaton induces a classical hybrid automaton where probabilistic branching is replaced by nondeterministic choices. Intuitively, the semantics of the latter spans the semantics of the former. Let H = (Flow , C, Init, UnSafe) be a probabilistic hybrid automaton. The induced hybrid automaton is a tuple ind (H) = (Flow , ind (C), Init, UnSafe).
Semantics
The semantics of a probabilistic hybrid automaton is a probabilistic automaton [32] . Let H = (Flow , C, Init, UnSafe) be a probabilistic hybrid automaton. Let ind (H) denote the induced hybrid automaton, and let T ind(H) = (S, T, Init, UnSafe) denote the transition system representing the semantics of ind (H). Recall that T = T C ∪ T D where T C corresponds to transitions due to continuous flows and T D corresponds to transitions due to discrete jumps.
The semantics of H is the probabilistic automaton M H = (S, Steps, Init, UnSafe) where S, Init, UnSafe are the same as in T ind(H) , and Steps is defined as the union of two transition relations Steps C , Steps D ⊆ S × Distr (S). Here, as in the non-probabilistic setting, Steps C corresponds to transitions due to continuous flows, while Steps D corresponds to transitions due to discrete jumps. Both of them are defined respectively as follows.
For each transition
Now we discuss transitions induced by discrete jumps. First, for a probabilistic guarded command c, we define its corresponding set Steps D (c). Let ind (c) = {u 1 , . . . , u qc } ∧ x2 = 0ẋ
be as defined in Definition 3.5. Then, for a number of q c + 1 arbitrary states (m, x),
for i = 1, . . . , q c . Then, Steps D is defined to be c∈C Steps D (c). Recall that we have assumed that q c is finite for all c. This implies Supp(µ) is finite for all transitions (s, µ) with s ∈ S.
Safety Properties
For hybrid automata, the safety property asserts that the unsafe states can never be reached. For probabilistic hybrid automata, however, the safety property expresses that the maximal probability of reaching the set UnSafe is bounded by some given threshold p. In the following we fix a certain threshold p.
The automaton H is called safe if for each adversary A and each initial state s of M(H), Prob A s (Reach(UnSafe)) ≤ p holds. Since safety verification in the non-probabilistic setting is an undecidable problem [18] , this implies that the safety problem in the probabilistic setting is also undecidable. In the following, we develop a framework for a heuristic algorithm to deal with such a probabilistic safety verification problem for general probabilistic hybrid automata.
Example 3.6 Consider the probabilistic hybrid automaton illustrated in Figure 1 . It contains the modes m 1 , m 2 and the continuous variables x 1 , x 2 which both range over the interval [0, 2], i.e, S = {m 1 , m 2 } × [0, 2] × [0, 2] (note that the state space can be restricted via state-space constraints). The set of initial states is given by the constraint Init(m, (x 1 , x 2 )) = (m = m 1 ∧x 1 = 0∧x 2 = 0). The constraint UnSafe(m, (x 1 , x 2 )) = (x 1 ≥ 1 ∧ x 2 ≥ 1.5) describes the set of unsafe states. The hybrid automaton can switch modes from m 1 to m 2 with two possibilities if x 2 = 1, i.e.,
The continuous behaviour is very simple: in mode m 1 , the values of the variables x 1 , x 2 change with slope 1; in mode m 2 , the slope of variable x 1 is 1 and variable x 2 is −1. For a flow in mode m 1 , the constraint 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1 must hold. The corresponding flow constraint is:
The constraint 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1 in Flow forces a jump from mode m 1 to m 2 if x 1 becomes 1.
The maximal reachability probability is 0.05, as can be seen as follows: From the initial state, we can only apply the probabilistic guarded command once and exactly if we wait until x 2 = 1, as seen from the guard. With probability 0.95, we then move to a state with m = m 2 , x 1 = 1, x 2 = 1. In this case, we cannot reach unsafe states, because in the following timed transitions x 2 is decreased and thus we will never have x 2 ≥ 1.5. However, with probability 0.05 we jump to an unsafe state directly. Because of this, the probabilistic system is safe if we have a threshold of e.g. p = 0.051 > 0.05.
Simulation Relations
We recall the notion of simulations between probabilistic automata. Intuitively, if M 2 simulates M 1 , that is, M 2 is an overapproximation of M 1 , then M 2 can mimic all behaviours of M 1 . Thus, this allows us to verify safety properties on the abstraction M 2 instead of M 1 . To establish the notion of simulations, we introduce first the notion of weight functions [21] , which establish the correspondence between distributions.
We write µ 1 R µ 2 if and only if there exists a weight function for (µ 1 , µ 2 ) with respect to R. Now, we recall the notion of simulations [31] , adapted to reachability properties. The simulation requires that every successor distribution of a state of M 1 is related to a successor distribution of its corresponding state of M 2 via a weight function.
Definition 3.8 Given two probabilistic automata M 1 = (S 1 , Steps 1 , Init 1 , UnSafe 1 ) and M 2 = (S 2 , Steps 2 , Init 2 , UnSafe 2 ), we say that M 2 simulates M 1 , denoted by M 1 M 2 , if and only if there exists a relation R ⊆ S 1 × S 2 , which we will call simulation relation from now on, such that 1. for each s 1 ∈ Init 1 there exists an s 2 ∈ Init 2 with (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R.
2. for each s 1 ∈ UnSafe 1 there exists an s 2 ∈ UnSafe 2 with (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R, and there does not exist an s ∈ S 2 \ UnSafe 2 such that (s 1 , s ) ∈ R.
for each pair
(s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R, if there exists (s 1 , µ 1 ) ∈ Steps 1 , then there exists a distribution µ 2 ∈ Distr (S 2 ) such that (s 2 , µ 2 ) ∈ Steps 2 and µ 1 R µ 2 .
Abstractions for Probabilistic Hybrid Automata
Various abstraction refinement techniques have been developed for verifying safety properties of non-probabilistic hybrid automata. All of them have a common strategy: the set S is covered by a finite set of abstract states, each representing a set of concrete states. Then, an abstraction is constructed, that is an overapproximation of the original system. Afterwards, the safety property is checked on the abstraction. If no abstract unsafe state is reachable, the original system is safe since the abstraction overapproximates the original system. If not, the covering might have been chosen too coarse, and a refinement step is needed. Following this idea, refinement techniques for abstractions based on subsuming concrete states by validity of predicates on the state variables have been used [13, 4, 30] .
Let H = (Flow , C, Init, UnSafe) be a probabilistic hybrid automaton. The aim of this section is-independently of which abstraction technique is used-to develop a framework for constructing an abstraction for H, which is a finite probabilistic automaton. First we introduce the notion of abstract states, which form a (not necessarily disjoint) covering of the concrete state space: In the above definition, for two abstract states (m, B 1 ) and (m, B 2 ) we might have B 1 ∩ B 2 = ∅ 2 . For instance, dependent on the abstraction technique used, B 1 and B 2 might have overlapping borders [30] , or common interiors [17] . Figure 2 illustrates how this section is organised. Given a probabilistic hybrid automaton H and an abstract state space B, we introduce the quotient automaton of both ind (H) and H with respect to B in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we show the soundness with respect to the quotient automaton (cf. Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7).
The quotient automaton is in general hard to compute. Thus, in Section 4.3 we introduce general abstractions, which overapproximate the quotient automata conservatively. In Section 4.4, we discuss how the abstraction for the given probabilistic hybrid automaton is constructed (see Figure 2 ): we first construct the abstraction of the induced hybrid automaton, from which the abstraction of the probabilistic setting is obtained afterwards.
Quotient Automaton for H
We define the quotient automaton for the probabilistic hybrid automaton H. First we define the quotient automaton for the induced hybrid automaton ind (H). As a convention, we use T , I, U to denote the set of transitions, initial states, unsafe states in the quotient automata. 
• T C corresponds to the set of abstract transitions due to continuous flow:
• T D corresponds to the set of abstract transitions due to discrete jumps. We first define the transition induced by one fixed update u ∈ ind (C):
Then, let T D = u∈ind(C) T D (u).
In the following let H = (Flow , C, Init, UnSafe) be a probabilistic hybrid automaton, let M H = (S, Steps C ∪ Steps D , Init, UnSafe) denote the probabilistic automaton representing the semantics of H, and let B be an abstract state space. As in the induced non-probabilistic setting, we define a quotient automaton, denoted by the probabilistic automaton Quo H (B), for the abstract state space B. For this, we first introduce the set of lifted distributions: Let µ be the distribution according to a probabilistic guarded command c. Since the covering B is in general not disjoint, a concrete state (m i , x i ) might belong to more than one abstract states. In this case, µ induces more than one lifted distribution. In the above definition, this is reflected by the way of defining one specific lifted distribution µ , for which we first fix to which abstract state each concrete state (m i , x i ) belongs. Note that if B is a disjoint partitioning of S, then the set lift B (µ) is a singleton. We now introduce the quotient automaton for the probabilistic hybrid automaton: 
Soundness
Given a probabilistic hybrid automaton H and a set of abstract states B, we defined a probabilistic quotient automaton Quo H (B). The following lemma shows that this automaton conservatively overapproximates M H . . . , u qc } be as described in Definition 3.5, and let (m i , x i ) = u i (m, x), where assume that i = 1, . . . , q c . Note that it could be the case that, for i = j, we have x i = x j . Moreover, let (m i , B i ) ∈ B denote an abstract state satisfying x i ∈ B i . By construction of the relation R, we know that ((m i , x i ), (m i , B i )) ∈ R. By the definition of ST (cf. Definition 4.4), we have that ((m, B) (1)), which implies the third condition. Since simulation on probabilistic automata preserves safety properties [31] , we have the correctness of our construction: 
Abstractions for H
Consider the probabilistic hybrid automaton H. The computation of the exact quotient automaton Quo H (B) as defined in Definition 4.4 refers to concrete states, and often is hard or even impossible. In this subsection, we introduce the notion of abstractions which overapproximate the quotient automata. As a convention, we use the primed version T , I , U to denote the set of transitions, initial states, unsafe states in the abstraction. In that case, we say also that Abs ind(H) (B) is an abstraction of the induced hybrid automaton ind (H). Similarly, we say also that Abs H (B) is an abstraction of the probabilistic hybrid automaton H. Since the abstraction as defined may have more initial states, unsafe states and transitions than the quotient automaton, it is easy to verify that the abstraction simulates the corresponding quotient automaton. Since simulation is transitive, the abstraction also simulates the corresponding semantics automaton. Thus, the abstraction preserves also safety properties of H.
Computing Abstractions
Let H be a probabilistic hybrid automaton. Existing methods [17, 4, 30] can be used to compute an abstraction Abs ind(H) (B) for the induced hybrid automaton ind (H). In the following, we define an abstraction based on Abs ind(H) (B): 
The set of transitions ST D (c) is indeed an overapproximation, which is illustrated as follows. 
Computing Reachability Probabilities
First we note that, similar as in the non-probabilistic case, only abstract states reachable from the initial abstract states are of interest. Below, we discuss briefly how to compute the maximal probability of reaching the set of abstract unsafe states in the abstraction.
Given an initial state s, the maximal probability of reaching the set of abstract unsafe states UnSafe from s is denoted by
where A ranges over all adversaries. Given the threshold p, the safety property is satisfied if Prob + s (Reach(UnSafe)) < p for all initial states s. The probability Prob + s (Reach(UnSafe)) can be characterised [7] as follows: it equals 1 if s ∈ UnSafe, it is 0 if UnSafe can't be reached from s at all, and otherwise it is
This suggests the following well-known value iteration approach [6] . As a preprocessing, those states which cannot be reached by any initial state, or cannot reach the unsafe states can be pruned, since the probabilities for those states are 0. We iteratively compute the solution vector v during the algorithm, and let v i denote the probability values in the i-th iteration. Initially, we let v else. Hence, v i (s) corresponds to the maximal probability of reaching UnSafe within a number of i steps, and moreover, it converges to Prob + s (Reach(UnSafe)) if i → ∞. In practice, a stopping criterion is needed to decide when the approximation is tight enough: in our tool (see Section 6) we choose the relative error stopping criterion, namely we stop if max s
≤ ε with ε = 10 −8 .
An Illustrating Example
As an illustrating example, we here consider the thermostat example depicted in Figure 5 , which is extended from the one of Alur et al. [4] . There are four modes: Cool , Heat, Check and Error . The latter mode models the occurrence of a failure, where the temperature sensor gets stuck at the temperature checked last. The set of variables is {t, x, T }, where T represents the temperature, t represents a local timer and x is used to measure the total time passed so far. Thus, in all modes it holds thatẋ = 1 andṫ = 1. In each mode there is also an invariant constraint restricting the state space of this mode. Invariant constraints are used only for the sake of convenience and comparison with [4] . The given initial condition is m = Heat ∧ t = 0 ∧ x = 0 ∧ 9 ≤ T ≤ 10. The unsafe constraint is m = Error ∧ x ≤ 5, which corresponds to reaching the Error mode within 5 time units. Assume that the probability threshold for this risk is specified to be p = 0.2.
First we observe that initially it is t = 0 and 9 ≤ T ≤ 10. The system cannot stay in the mode Heat for 2 time units, as this would increase the temperature by 4 units which violates the invariant T ≤ 10 at Heat. This means that the system must switch to mode Figure 6 : A fragment of the abstract states and abstract transitions of the thermostat. Each of the depicted abstract states has a self loop (which is not depicted) due to continuous flows. Now we consider an abstraction of the thermostat example. The initial abstract state is (Heat, B) , where B represents concrete valuations satisfying the constraint t ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, t = x and T ≤ 10. In Figure 6 , we depicted fragments of the abstract states and of those abstract transitions which lead to abstract unsafe states. Notably, in this abstraction there are two chances to touch abstract unsafe states, thus the probability amounts to 0.05+0.95· 0.05 = 0.0975. The reason is that from the initial state Heat the abstract system does not need go back to Cool to let the temperature decrease, instead it can immediately switch to Check . This is due to the overapproximation of the abstract initial states. However, the computed probability for the threshold p = 0.2 is still good enough to prove the safety property. If instead the threshold were set between 0.05 and 0.0975, refinement would have been needed.
Experiments
We implemented our method in the prototypical tool ProHVer (probabilistic hybrid automata verifier). It combines a modified version of PHAVer [17] to obtain the abstract state space with a component to compute an upper probability bound for the reachability problem using value iteration (cf. Subsection 4.5) in the induced abstract probabilistic automaton.
PHAVer can handle continuous dynamics with constant bounds on the derivatives exactly. In order to be able to handle affine dynamics not in this class, it uses overapproximation. Here it splits locations (introducing new discrete locations) such that the continuous state space of the resulting locations are polyhedra of a predefined maximal width. It is possible to improve the precision of the overapproximation by reducing this maximal width. However, the resulting covering and location splits can look entirely different, which is also reflected on the probabilistic side. This phenomenon of PHAVer may induce situations, where that reduced width setting does not lead to tighter probability bounds. Usually, however, bounds do improve.
To show the applicability of our approach, we applied ProHVer to several case studies, which are small but diverse in the nature of their behaviour. In most of the examples considered, we focus on reachability probabilities with upper time bounds (obtained by using an additional clock to measure time), because these correspond to very natural verification problems for the settings considered. Notably, our method is not restricted to time-bounded reachability. Actually, time-unbounded problems are simpler (because no additional clock is needed). Experiments were run on a Pentium 4 with 2.16GHz and 2GB RAM.
Bouncing Ball
We consider a bouncing ball assembled from different materials. Assume this ball consisting of three parts: 50 per cent of its surface consists of hard material, 25 per cent consists of a material of medium hardness and the rest consists of very soft material. We drop the ball from a height h = 2. Further, we assume the gravity constant to be g = 1. If the ball hits the floor and falls on the hard side, it will jump up again with one half of the speed it had before, and if it falls down on the medium side it will jump up with a quarter of the speed. However, if it hits the ground with its soft side, it won't jump up again. We assume that the side with which the ball hits the ground is determined randomly, according to the amount of surface covered by each of the materials.
We study the probability that the ball falls on the soft side before a given time bound. Results are given in Table 1 . We conducted three main analysis settings. With "interval length" we denote the splitting interval for the PHAVer-specific refinement technique, as described in the beginning of Section 6. In the left and medium part of the table, we used partitioning with interval length of 0.15 on the position and speed variables. For the medium part, we used the PHAVer-specific convex hull overapproximation [17] . For the right part of the table, we used an interval length of 0.05, and the convex hull overapproximation. Entries for which the analysis did not terminate within one hour are marked by "-".
We ascertain here that, without the convex hull overapproximation, with an interval of length 0.15, we obtain non-trivial upper bounds. However, the analysis time as well as the number of states grows very fast with increasing time bound. The reason for this to happen is, that each time the ball hits the ground, there are three possibilities with which side it will hit the ground. Thus, the number of possibilities for the amount of energy the ball still has after a number of times n the ground is hit is exponential in n. Also notice that there is some time bound up to which the ball has done an infinite number of jumps in all cases, as this case study features Zeno behaviour. This indicates that for time bounds near this value we have to use very small partitioning intervals to obtain realistic probability bounds. This If we use the convex hull overapproximation and an interval length of 0.15, far less resources have to be used. But we only obtain non-trivial results for time bounds up to 3. Using an interval width of 0.05, we obtain a tighter probability bound, while using still less resources than the first configuration. However, for time bound T = 3.7 the third configuration does not terminate within one hour.
For a time bound of 3, we can compute the probability manually: the ball can hit the ground with its soft side when it hits the floor in first place with a probability of 0.25. It hits the ground initially with its hard side with a probability of 0.5. In this case, it won't hit the ground again before T = 3. If it first hits the ground with its medium hard side, it will hit the ground a second time before T = 3. After this, there is no chance of touching the ground again before the time bound. Because of this, the overall probability of the property under consideration is 0.25 + 0.25 · 0.25 = 0.3125. This means that the result obtained by using an interval length of 0.05 and the convex hull overapproximation is exact.
Thermostat
We consider the thermostat example discussed in Section 5. For the safety property discussed there, ProHVer can verify this nontrivial system and property, and will answer that the system is safe, the upper bound computed is 0.097.
In Table 2 , we give further probability bounds and performance statistics (time to build the abstraction-the value iteration time is negligible-and number of constructed abstract states) for different time bounds. For the left (right) part of the table, we set the interval length for the variable x to 2 (respectively 10). The time needed for the analysis as well as the number of states of the abstract transition systems grows about linearly in the time bound, though with oscillations. Comparing the left and the right side, we see that for the larger interval we need less resources, as was to be expected. Due to the way PHAVer splits locations along intervals, for some table entries, we see somewhat counterintuitive behaviour. We observe that bounds do not necessarily improve with decreasing interval length. This is because PHAVer computes abstractions without taking into account probabilities, and hence does not guarantee abstractions with smaller intervals to be an improvement of the probability bound, though they are in most cases. Moreover, the abstractions we obtain from PHAVer also do not necessarily guarantee probability bounds to increase monotonically with the time bound. This is because a slightly increased time bound might induce an entirely different abstraction, leading to a tighter probability bound, and thus giving the impression of a decrease in probability, even though the actual maximal probability indeed stays the same or increases.
Water Level Control
We consider a model of a water level control system (extended from the one of Alur et al. [3] ) which uses wireless sensors. Values submitted are thus subject to probabilistic delays, due to the unreliable transport medium. A sketch of the model is given in Figure 7 . The water level y of a tank is controlled by a monitor. Its change is specified by a linear function. Initially, the water level is y = 1. When no pump is turned on (s 0 ), the tank is filled by a constant stream of water (ẏ). This water streams out of a larger water tank, which initially has a water level of W . We thus haveẆ = −1 in all modes of the system, and stop the system as soon as W reaches 0. For clarity, we do not explicitly included the dynamics of W in Figure 7 . When a water level of y = 10 is seen by a sensor of the tank, the pump should be turned on. However, the pump features a certain delay, which results from submitting control data via a wireless network. With a probability of 0.95 this delay takes 2 time units (s 1 ), but with a probability of 0.05 it takes 3 time units (s 1 ). The delay is realised by the timer x. After the delay has passed, the water is pumped out with a higher speed than it is filled into the tank (ẏ = −2 in s 2 ). There is another sensor to check whether the water level is below 5. If this is the case, the pump must turn off again. Again, we have a distribution over delays here (s 3 and s 3 ). For the system to work correctly, the water level must stay between 1 and 12.
We are interested in the probability that the pump system violates the property given above, that is either the water level falls below 1 or grows above 12, before the larger water tank from which the water tank is filled becomes empty. We model the system in ProHVer and reason about this property: performance statistics are given in Table 3 . Without using partitioning, we were only able to obtain exact values for W up to 82 including. Notice that we did not use the convex hull overapproximation, like in the bouncing ball case study, nor another overapproximation. For W larger than this value, we always obtained a probability limit of 1. To get tighter results, we partitioned x by an interval of length 2. For W below 83 we obtain the exact value in both table parts, whereas for 83 we obtain a useful upper bound only when using partitioning. A plot of probabilities for different W is given in Figure 8 . The graph has a staircase form where wide steps alternate with narrow ones. This form results, because each time the longer time bound is randomly chosen, the tank will overflow or underflow respectively, if there is enough time left. The wide steps corresponds to the chance of overflow in the tank, the narrow ones to the chance 
Autonomous Lawn-Mower
We consider an autonomous lawn-mower that uses a probability bias to avoid patterns on lawns. This mower is started on a rectangular grassed area. When it reaches the border of the area, it changes its direction. To prevent the mower from following a simple cyclic pattern, this direction is randomly biased, such as to ensure that finally the entire area has been cut. A sketch of the automaton is given in Figure 9 . There, l is the length and h the width of the area. The position of the mower on the area is given by (x, y). With (v x , v y ) we denote the speed in (x, y) direction, which the mower takes with a probability of 0.95 when reaching a border, whereas with (v x , v y ) denotes a variation of the speed that is taken with probability 0.05. Further, (x g , y g ) describes the mower's initial position.
At the region with x ≥ 90 ∧ x ≤ 100 ∧ y ≥ 170 ∧ y ≤ 200 the owner of the lawn has left a tarpaulin. We are interested in the probability that within a time bound of t = 120 the mower hits the tarpaulin, thereby inevitably ripping it up.
For the analysis, we set v x = 10, v y = 10, v x = 11, v y = 9, l = 100, h = 200, x g = 10, y g = 20. The creation of the labelled transition system for this automaton took 98 seconds whereas the computation time of the failure probability was negligible. The upper bound we obtained was 0.000281861. We did not use any interval specifications.
As in the other case studies, we also varied the time bound. Results are given in Table 4 . For larger time bounds the analysis time as well as the number of states grows quickly. This is due to a similar effect as in the bouncing ball case study. Each time the mower reaches a Table 4 : Lawn-mower performance figures border, it may head into two different directions, which leads to a combinatorial explosion, evident by the above statistics. We also experimented with convex hull overapproximation without interval refinement. However, the probability bounds obtained were always 1. Using interval partitioning also did not improve on this, as it only made the analyses take more time. We feel that for this case study there is not much hope of obtaining better results in resource usage. The complexity does not really live in the hybrid behaviour, but results from the excessive number of ways the mower can pass around the area. Because of this, we don't think it is possible to find an abstraction to handle this case study for larger time bounds.
Summary of Case Studies
We successfully applied our method on a number of case studies. However, it seems worthwhile to explore techniques more adapted to the generation of transition systems for probabilistic systems, especially by adjusting the splitting of states to a method better adapted to our needs. We may do so, for instance, by finding means to guarantee non-decreasing probability bounds when smaller intervals are used. Another possibility would be to do a more fine-grained splitting at places where this is useful to decrease the probability bound, while saving space by a coarser abstraction for parts of the model where this is sufficient to obtain a tight probability bound. Mostly, the upper bounds we could obtain were tight or exact (checked by manual inspection).
In Table 5 , we give running times for the largest instances completed successfully: Here, means success (exact or tight upper bounds) while / means useful results for only some instances. Our implementation is effective in most cases considered, but there is ball thermostat water mower 214s 398s 365s 743s / 
Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed how to check safety properties for probabilistic hybrid automata. These models and properties are of central importance for the design and verification of emerging wireless and embedded real-time applications. Moreover, being based on arbitrary abstractions computed by tools for the analysis of non-probabilistic hybrid automata, improvements in effectivity of such tools directly carry over to improvements in effectivity of the technique we describe. The applicability of our approach has been demonstrated on a number of case studies, tackled using a prototypical implementation.
As future work we are investigating whether our approach can be adapted to the safety verification problem for more general probabilistic hybrid systems [9, 11] , that is, systems with stochastic differential equations instead of ordinary differential equations.
